By DAVID MURPHYIn the 1970s, the city of Toronto was looking to build its own “urban renewal” policy.
A decade later, with its new downtown core built, the plan to remake the city had evolved into a more modern version of the urban renewal plan that had been proposed in the 1970’s.
It was called the Spadina subway, and it would connect the city’s core to the city center, where new housing would be built and restaurants and shops would open.
The subway was to be funded with tax increment financing, or TIF, a system where developers are required to build new buildings to meet certain environmental standards and to generate revenues for city coffers.
In the process, the TTC was supposed to generate $1 billion in revenue per year by selling the surplus to the provincial government.
Toronto was supposed, as one councillor put it, to be the city with the greatest “investment in its future”.
The idea was to create a vibrant city that would generate jobs and wealth, create a sense of community, and attract businesses.
But the program, now known as the Toronto Urban Renewal Plan, or TORR, was quickly revealed to be nothing of the sort.
Its architects, John Daley and John Eglinton, were found guilty of fraud and corruption.
The plan’s authors, Peter Wallace and Robert Gordon, faced criminal charges, and were eventually convicted of defrauding the public and their own city.
The scandal was, in many ways, a harbinger of the challenges faced by Toronto as it attempts to reinvent itself in the 21st century.
As the cost of living increased in the city, as its population began to decline and the housing market dried up, the growth of condo, townhouse and even luxury rental units in the downtown area fell off, making it harder to afford the cost to build and maintain the new homes needed to sustain the revitalization effort.
As more and more of the existing housing stock was built on city-owned land, the quality of housing on the outskirts of the city also began to deteriorate.
As a result, the population in Toronto began to shrink.
Toronto now faces a city with a population of about 20 million people, less than a third of its population in 1960, and a housing shortage that has made the city far less affordable for people of modest means.
And the biggest problem is, as Wallace and Gordon acknowledged, Toronto is not the city that its planners and developers had imagined.
Toronto was supposed in the late 1970s to be a place where people could live “affordablely and safely”.
But by the early 2020s, Toronto had become the most expensive place in Canada to buy a home.
While the average price of a single-family home in Toronto jumped from $1.5 million in 1981 to $4.9 million in 2013, the average home price in Greater Toronto grew by just 8 per cent between 1981 and 2014.
And then, last year, the Toronto city council passed a plan that would help address the growing housing shortage.
Called the Scarborough Subway Plan, it would increase the number of subway stations in the Scarborough neighbourhood, the number and location of which would be announced in a public consultation process, and would fund a number of new transit options.
The goal was to make the city more affordable for low-income residents by providing them with the infrastructure they need to get around, but at the same time making it easier for those who already have access to public transit to get to work, school and other amenities.
The Scarborough Subway plan has become a symbol of Toronto’s housing crisis.
It has been the subject of two books, one by the city planner Richard Prum and the other by Toronto city councillor Adam Vaughan.
Both books describe a crisis that Toronto has been living with for decades, one that the city has tried to solve through the creation of new and more affordable housing, but has failed to do.
The problem is that Toronto is a very large city with many subdivisions, many new construction projects, and, increasingly, many condo developments.
These new condos are being built with subsidies, usually from developers, which help pay for the cost, but which have little or no effect on the quality or availability of the housing.
In many cases, the new condos provide a significant improvement over what they were built to provide, which is to say, they do not improve the quality and availability of existing housing.
Toronto’s condo market has been on a slow decline for a long time.
In 1981, just over half of the units sold in the condo market were condos.
By 2013, that had dropped to around half, with condos representing less than 10 per cent of the market.
By the end of 2016, condos had declined to just 1 per cent, and they are now hovering at less than 3 per cent.
The result of the Scarborough subway plan is that the number that people who currently live in the 416 are buying,